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Conventional wisdom in the philosophy of mind holds (1) that minds are exclusively possessed by individuals and (2) that no constitutive part of a mind can have a mind of its own. For example, the paradigmatic minds of human beings are in the purview of individual organisms and associated closely with the brain; no parts of the brain that are constitutive of a human mind are considered capable of having a mind.
1 Let us refer to the conjunction of (1) and (2) as standard individualism about minds (SIAM). Put succinctly, SIAM says that all minds are singular minds. This conflicts with the group mind thesis (GMT), understood as the claim that there are collective types of minds that comprise two or more singular minds among their constitutive parts. The related concept of group cognition refers to psychological states, processes or capacities that are attributes of such collective minds.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the GMT notoriously served as a rallying point for the nascent study of group phenomena.
2 By analyzing the behaviour of groups in mentalistic terms, its advocates sought to emphasize that groups can function as agents in their own right, with emergent features that cannot be reduced to the actions of individuals. However, to its own detriment, the emergence of group minds was often expressed with biological metaphors that were borrowed from the vitalist tradition. The vitalists believed that life is the product of a mysterious organic force ( vis vitalis ) that is fundamentally different from the physico-chemical principles that govern inanimate things. Because of this close association, the demise of vitalism as a result of the modern evolutionary synthesis in biology meant that the concept of group minds or group agency was equally banished from the realm of respectable scientific discourse.
In recent years, the once-discredited concept of group cognition has shown definite signs of a comeback. A fair amount of recent work in the cognitive and social sciences has been premised on the idea that groups can constitute distributed cognitive systems ( What all of the above studies have in common -the list could be greatly expanded -is that they attribute one or more psychological properties to certain kinds of social groups. In this sense, we may consider them contemporary versions of the GMT, even though they are all compatible with a broadly physicalistic world view. However, despite this common ground, there are important differences between their respective views of why some psychological property should count as a group level phenomenon. If we want to understand these differences, it is critical to develop a shared 'lingua franca' we can use to taxonomize different variants of group cognition. It is the goal of this chapter to contribute to this larger enterprise. It is organized as follows. First, I elaborate on the distinction between singular and group minds and draw a distinction between hive cognition, collective cognition and socially distributed cognition. Then I briefly clarify the concept of mind we can plausibly take to be at play in the present debate. In the rest of the chapter, I sketch an analysis of the emergent character of socially distributed cognition that is free from the metaphysical shackles of vitalism. I close with a few remarks on the idea that there are multiple levels of cognition.
Group minds vs. singular minds
In his discussion of the GMT, Wilson (2001, S265), distinguishes two ways in which minds -or mental properties more generally -have been conceived as emergent properties of groups. According to the multilevel
